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right to have cumulated in one suit the deceased's surviving
action and the wrongful death actions proper, vested in the
statutory beneficiaries. 25 No legislation compelled the court to
reach this result. A similar right of joinder might be given the
defendant in actions for wrongful injury and actions by others
for their moral injury, caused by the incapacity of the physically
injured. Then, as now, only one suit would follow each wrongful
injury and the defendant would have his wrongdoing and finan-
cial responsibility brought before the trier of fact only once. The
remaining question would then be, should the family's interests
in each other's well being be protected by allowing recovery for
the moral injury suffered by them as a result of the physical
injury of one member. This addresses itself purely to one's sense
of natural justice. The question has been answered in the af-
firmative by our Supreme Court in the area of wrongful death. 26
Surely the moral impact of a dear one's death is not necessarily
greater or of longer duration than that of his physical or mental
mutilation. Nor does it seem that the harm suffered by the
injured party's family is more directly or proximately caused by
the defendant's fault when death ensues than when it does not.
The Louisiana Constitution provides that "every person for
injury done him in his rights, lands, goods, person or reputation
shall have adequate remedy by due process of law and justice
administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay."
Even to allow nominal damages to the aggrieved family would




AGAINST THIRD PERSONS-NATURE OF CLAIM
Plaintiff's employee had been fatally injured during the
course of and within the scope of his employment due to the
alleged negligence of the defendant. An action was brought
under La. R.S. 23:1101 by the employer against the defendant, a
third person tortfeasor, for amounts paid and to be paid under the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law to the dependent il-
25. Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 1082, 136 So. 59 (1931); Norton v. Crescent
City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855 (1933).
26. See note 12 supra.
27. LA. CONST. Art. I, § 6.
legitimate, minor daughter of the plaintiff's deceased employee.
Defendant filed exceptions of no right and no cause of action,
contending that plaintiff's suit depends entirely on the fact that
there is an outstanding cause of action in tort, and that plaintiff's
rights arise only through subrogation to the rights of the depend-
ent illegitimate child; that since the illegitimate child could not
bring a tort action, neither could the plaintiff as mere subrogee
of the rights of the illegitimate child to such action.' The trial
court entered judgment for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal,
Orleans Circuit, reversed and maintained the exceptions of no
right and no cause of action.2 On plaintiff's application the Loui-
siana Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. Held, defend-
ant's liability, if any, is in tort. However, La. R.S. 23:1101 grants
to the blameless employer a separate right of action when an
injury, for which he has paid compensation, has been sustained
under circumstances creating in a third party a legal liability to
pay damages in respect thereto. The separate right of action
granted to the employer vests at the moment that there arises in
the third party a legal liability to the injured employee. Board
of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans v. New Orleans, 223 La. 199,
65 So.2d 313 (1953).
When an injury has occurred under conditions which create
in a third party a "legal liability" to pay damages, La. R.S.
23:1101 contemplates recovery by the blameless employer for
any compensation which he is forced to pay.8 The employer's
right under this provision arises by reason of the legal liability
of the third party to the injured employee under the basic Loui-
siana tort law, Article 2315, of the Civil Code.4 Because of
1. Under Art. 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, the illegitimate cannot bring
action in tort for injury and death of a parent. Youchican v. Texas & P. Ry.,
147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551 (1920). However, under the Workmen's Compensation
Law the illegitimate is allowed recovery for the death of a parent. Thompson
v. Vestal Lumber and Manufacturing Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So.2d 842 (1944).
2. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans v. Public Belt R. Commission
for City of New Orleans, 58 So.2d 306 (La. App. 1952).
3. "When an injury for which compensation is payable under this chapter
has been sustained under circumstances creating in some person [in this
Section referred to as third person] other than the employer a legal liability
to pay damages in respect thereto .... Any employer having paid or having
become obligated to pay compensation... may bring suit against such third
person to recover any amount which he has paid or become obligated to pay
as compensation to any injured employee or his dependents." LA. R.S.
§ 23:1101 (1950). (Italics supplied.)
4. Art. 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, as amended, La. Acts 1948, No. 333, § 1,
p. 808: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges
him by whose fault it happened to repair it; the right of this action shall
survive in case of death in favor of the children, including adopted children
and children given in adoption, or spouse of the deceased, or either of them,
and in default of these in favor of the surviving father and mother or either
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previous decisions interpreting La. R.S. 23:1101, there had been
speculation whether or not it granted a separate right of action
to the employer or made him a mere subrogee to the rights of
the employee or his dependents under Article 2315. 5 Had the
court in the instant case found the plaintiff's right of action to
depend solely upon subrogation, his recovery would have been
precluded, since it is well settled that the illegitimate child can-
not recover in tort for the injury or death of a parent.6 The
reason for this appears from the development of Article 2315.
It had been held in Hubgh v. New Orleans & C.R.R., decided
in 1851,7 that the action for personal injuries abates upon death
unless survival of the action is specifically granted by statute.
That decision also held that in the absence of statutory provisions
the wrongful death of a human being does not give rise to a
cause of action. It was therefore necessary to amend Article
2315 to prevent an abatement of the cause of action upon the
death of the victim. An amendment in 18558 authorizing the
survival of tort actions designated two classes of members of the
family who would be entitled to maintain the action, and the
of them, and in default of any of the above persons, then in favor of the
surviving blood brothers and sisters, or either of them, for the space of one
year from the death. However, should the deceased leave a surviving spouse,
together with minor children, the right of ,action shall accrue to both the
surviving spouse and the minor children. The right of action shall accrue
to the major children only in those cases where there is no surviving spouse
or minor child or children.
"If the above right of action exists in favor of an adopted person, it shall
survive in case of death in favor of the children or spouse of the deceased,
or either of them, and in default of these in favor of the surviving adoptive
parents, or either of them, for the space of one year from the death. How-
ever, this right of action shall survive in favor of the blood parent or parents
to the exclusion of the adoptive parent or parents when at the time of the
adoption the adopted was a major, or emancipated minor whose adoption
was effected without the consent of the blood parent or parents evidenced
in the act of adoption. In default of these, it shall survive in favor of the
surviving blood brothers and sisters of the adopted person, or either of them,
for the space of one year from the death.
"The survivors above mentioned may also recover the damages sustained
by them by the death of the parent or child or husband or wife or brothers
or sisters or adoptive parent, or parents, or adopted person, as the case
may be."
5. In the cases of Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Bowdon,
181 La. 295, 159 So. 394 (1935); Chauvin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 177
La. 193, 148 So. 23 (1933), the court held the employer, under LA. R.S. § 23:1101
(1950), to be a statutory subrogee. Contra: Foster & Glassell Co. v. Knight
Bros., 152 La. 596, 93 So. 913 (1922).
6. Thompson v. Vestal Lumber and Manufacturing Co., 208 La. 83, 22
So.2d 842 (1944); Youchican v. Texas & P. Ry., 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551 (1920);
Green v. New Orleans, S. & G.I.R.R., 141 La. 120, 74 So. 717 (1917).
7. Hubgh v. New Orleans & C.R.R., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851). For a good
discussion of this case, see Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful
Death at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana Law, 6 TULANE L.
Rsv. 218 (1932).
8. La. Acts 1855, No. 223, p. 270.
NOTES
illegitimate child was not included. A further amendment to the
article in 1884 created an independent cause of action in favor
of the same proup of persons for damages suffered by reason of
a wrongful death.9
Thus the court in the instant case could depend on neither
the survival claim nor the wrongful death action. 0 It relied
instead upon the initial liability which came into being when the
injury was inflicted.1 This liability, even, though later extin-
guished by the death of the injured worker, was sufficient to
bring into operation the employer's right of action under La. R.S.
12:1101.12
The damages recoverable by the employer under the subro-
gation theory have generally been limited to the amount which
his subrogor could have recovered had he brought suit. There-
fore, the amount of damages, if based upon the personal suffering
of the victim, could well vary with the length of time the victim
lived after the accident.1 On the other hand, damages would
likely be large in a wrongful death action. In the instant case, by
the mere fact of the victim's employment the third party becomes
liable to the employer for the compensation which the employer
has been forced to pay for the death of the employee. Thus the
measure of damages under La. R.S. 23:1101 is found in the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law, rather than in
the provisions of Article 2315.
Herbert Lee Leonard
9. La. Acts 1884, No. 71, p. 94.
10. When there are no enumerated dependents in existence it appears
that the Hubgh decision would control. Hubgh v. New Orleans & C.R.R., 6 La.
Ann. 495 (1851).
11. The repudiation of the subrogation theory would seem to run con-
trary to the decision of Chauvin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 177 La.
193, 148 So. 23 (1933), where the constitutionality of LA. R.S. § 23:1101 (1950)
was upheld on the grounds that the statute did not go beyond its title by
adversely affecting the rights of third persons. This decision was based upon
the theory that the employer was only a subrogee to the rights of the
employee or his dependents. It would therefore appear that the court, in the
instant case, by overruling the defendant's allegation of subrogation has
in effect made LA. R.S. § 23:1101 (1950) unconstitutional. It is submitted,
however, that had the court been squarely presented with this problem, it
would have been circumvented.
12. See note 3 supra. This would also anticipate cases where the employee
was contributerily negligent, for then the third party would have no legal
liability to pay damages.
13. The amount of damages on survival of a personal injury claim
depends upon the injury sustained and suffering endured by the deceased
himself and in cases of immediate death is usually nominal. Van Amburg v.
V.S. & P. Ry., 37 La. Ann. 650 (1885).
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